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I. Introduction

“Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction,
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”1
Warren Buffet made this statement to Berkshire shareholders in
2002.2 The potential threat of the derivatives market was known
then and became real in 2008. Now the government is taking
action to control it.
The financial crisis of 2008 was one of the largest in
American history and almost led to the collapse of the U.S.
financial system.3 Factors likely contributing to the crisis include
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the influx of foreign money,
the popularity of hedge funds and private equity, and the rise of
mortgage-backed securities.4 Although the financial crisis of 2008
had numerous causes, the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative
market was one of the most noted.5
1. Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of Bd., Berkshire Hathaway,
Inc., to S’holder, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 23, 2003) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Paul B. Farrell, Derivatives the New ‘Ticking Bomb’ Buffet and
Gross Warn: $516 Trillion Bubble is a Disaster Waiting to Happen,
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/derivativesare-the-new-ticking-time-bomb (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing how the
derivatives market grew from $100 trillion in 2002, at the time Warren Buffett’s
letter was written, to $516 trillion in 2007, the year prior to the financial crisis)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse
College: Four Questions About the Financial Crisis (April 14, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See William Spencer Topham, Re-regulating “Financial Weapons of
Mass Destruction,” Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act and Future Derivative Regulation, 47 WILLIAMETTE L. REV.
133, 135 (2010) (listing suspected causes of the 2008 financial crisis).
5. See ALAN N. RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE
LAW, 173–74 (2009) (explaining the risks associated with credit derivatives that
posed many issues for AIG in 2008, ultimately leading to the corporation’s
government bailout); Jeremy Gogel, Shifting Risk to the Dumbest Guy in the
Room—Derivatives Regulation After the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 30–31 (2010) (addressing the role that the
derivatives market, especially credit default swaps, played in the 2008 financial
crisis); Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 87–89 (2011) (explaining that OTC
derivatives contributed to the financial crisis by “laying the foundation for faulty
risk modeling and by contributing to bank-like runs”).
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Some say that the OTC market’s influence on the financial
crisis was a result of the market’s large financial volume and a
lack of corresponding government regulation.6 As of July 2010,
the OTC derivatives market had a notional value of
approximately $300 trillion in the United States.7 This amount is
roughly twenty times the size of the American economy.8 The
notional amount is a way in which derivatives are priced, but it
does not consider the risk involved.9 This risk can be much
smaller or larger than the notional contract amount.10 Because
this market is large and rapidly growing, regulation is necessary
but will never completely eliminate the risks the market poses
because of the complexity of the contracts and the rate of
innovation in the market.11
The widespread use of OTC derivatives for speculative
purposes exposes market participants to systemic risk.12 Systemic
risk arises when investors hold highly leveraged positions that
could trigger a crisis like that of 2008.13 Due to the number of
6. See Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and
Why Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent Another 1 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ
Research, Paper No. 09-13) [hereinafter Stout, Deregulating Derivatives]
(theorizing that the banking system failure in 2008 was caused primarily by the
deregulation of the derivatives market in 2000); see also infra Part IV.A
(providing a background on past derivatives regulation and why the government
chose not to act until the 2008 crisis).
7. See The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, 2 (July 1, 2010) (statement of Gary Gensler,
Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n) [hereinafter Gary Gensler
Testimony].
8. Id.
9. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-94-133, FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 35 (1994)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
10. See id.
11. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the
Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985, 1013–14
(explaining how the unprecedented rate of financial innovation in the OTC
market is largely due to persons with quantitative or physical science
backgrounds playing vital roles in pricing the contracts).
12. See Laurin C. Ariail, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: The Impact of Dodd–Frank on End-Users Hedging
Commercial Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets, 15 N.C. BANKING
INST. 175, 179–80 (2011) (discussing the risks that the OTC derivatives market
poses to market participants and the financial economy as a whole).
13. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of
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OTC contracts and their interconnection with other trading
instruments, a small market shift in the value of an OTC
derivative could lead to a major international liquidity problem.14
OTC derivatives enhance systemic risk dramatically because they
lack transparency.15 Improving transparency in the OTC market
is precisely why regulation and disclosure are necessary for all
participants.
To protect the economy from systemic risk, Congress passed
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act16 (Dodd–Frank) in an effort to increase transparency,
regulate pricing in the derivatives market, and, most
importantly, minimize the risk to the American people.17 Title VII
of Dodd–Frank proposes guidelines that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) are required to follow when
promulgating regulations for the derivatives market.18 One of the
most important changes Dodd–Frank requires is the formulation
of a clearing organization for OTC derivatives, particularly
swaps.19
The regulation for clearing organizations requires market
participants to set initial margin requirements, post or recover
collateral at the end of each day, and provide certain disclosures
that were previously not required.20 This only applies to “swap

Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 1019, 1040 (2010) (discussing how the
size of the credit default swap market could cause a ripple effect throughout
financial markets even when only one small thing goes awry).
14. See id.
15. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 179–80 (indicating that the opaqueness of
the market is a major risk associated with the OTC market).
16. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 711–774, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 [hereinafter Dodd–
Frank].
17. See Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets
Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4173 Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 111th Cong.
164 (Sept. 22, 2009) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n) [hereinafter Schapiro].
18. Dodd–Frank § 717.
19. Id. § 725. This section pertains specifically to CFTC’s jurisdiction over
non-security based swaps. Id.
20. CFTC General Regulations and Derivatives Clearing Organizations
Rule, 17 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 39 (2010).
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dealers” and “major swap participants.”21 These definitions apply
to participants who hold large positions that would create
substantial counterparty exposure and increase the threat of
systemic risk.22
When defining these terms, the CFTC examined the
appropriate risk factors associated with these users and the role
they allegedly played in the 2008 financial crisis.23 Nonfinancial
corporations who participate in the market, commonly classified
as “end-users,” are not subject to the mandatory clearing of
swaps.24 An end-user is a corporation that utilizes the OTC
market to enter into customized contracts that hedge an already
exposed risk, such as fluctuation in interest rates or foreign
currency.25 A survey of the world’s largest 500 companies
revealed that 94% of them use the derivatives market as endusers to manage and hedge business risk.26 Thus, a large number
of market participants are not subject to regulation.
The end-user exception defines end-users narrowly and
provides minimal regulation requirements.27 It applies to a
nonfinancial entity that is a participant and uses swaps to hedge
or mitigate commercial risk.28 The only real requirement for endusers is to elect the exception and then notify the Commission as
to how it will generally meet its financial obligation.29
21. Id. 77 Fed. Reg. 30596 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1)
provides a definition of “swap dealer,” “security-based swap dealer,” “major
swap participant,” and “major security-based swap participant.”
22. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5907 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Blanche Lincoln) (stating that when defining major swap participant, the CFTC
should consider the risk factors associated with holding a substantial position in
the OTC market).
23. See id.
24. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 39 (2012).
25. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (introducing the corporate
end-user and its role in the OTC market).
26. See ISDA Survey Results: Derivatives Usage by the World’s Largest
Companies, ISDA NEWS RELEASE (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www2.isda.org/
functional-areas/research/surveys/end-user-surveys (last visited Sept. 27, 2012)
[hereinafter ISDA NEWS RELEASE] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
27. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 39 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Id.; see infra Part V.A for an in-depth description of the end-user
exception.
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Commercial end-users disfavor the narrow interpretation
and the minimal level of regulation that it imposes.30 Commercial
end-users wanted the CFTC to broadly cast the definition of enduser to include affiliate companies who utilize the market and,
further, allow commercial end-users to hedge risk in the OTC
market with minimal transaction costs.31 This Note examines the
CFTC’s rule pertaining to the end-user exception and analyzes
whether the CFTC’s narrow interpretation is the most beneficial
approach. This Note proposes that the CFTC broaden the enduser definition to exempt more users, such as small banks and
corporate affiliates.32 But to broaden the exception, this Note
argues that regulators must impose stricter disclosure and
reporting requirements to monitor the market for abuse of the
exception. The end-user exemption’s aim is to maintain low
transaction costs, but regulators must monitor closely the
potential abuse of this exception. The risk is that participants
could disguise speculative uses of the market in the form of bonafide hedging.
This Note emphasizes the CFTC’s definition of end-user
because the CFTC has jurisdiction over all commodity-based
swaps (including interest rate swaps), options, and futures.33
Based on statistics from the Bank of International Settlements,
interest rate contracts on the OTC market comprised 78% of all
30. Letter from Mark Magnesen, Sr. Vice President & Treasurer, Kraft
Foods Inc., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y of the Comm’n, CFTC (Feb. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter Kraft Foods Letter] (providing commentary to proposed rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 80474, in favor of a broad end-user exception and less regulation of
end-users) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See id. at 6–7 (addressing the particular concerns Kraft Foods, Inc. has
pertaining to the definition of the end-user).
32. See id. at 2 (discussing how Kraft’s affiliate corporations utilize the
OTC derivative market as agents for Kraft and Kraft’s subsidiary companies to
hedge exposed market risk). Kraft has a complex structure that calls for two
affiliate companies to enter into swap transactions with Kraft, its subsidiary
corporations, and at times, swap dealers. Id. Due to the affiliate corporations’
active participation in the OTC market, Kraft submitted a comment to the
CFTC end-user exception to guarantee that the affiliate’s participation and use
would fall within the definition of end-user. See id. at 4–5.
33. See 156 Cong. Rec. 105, S5293 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Blanche Lincoln) (stating that non-narrow-based security index swaps and
credit default swaps may be the only swaps that will fall within the jurisdiction
of the SEC).
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outstanding contracts on the market in June 2011.34 Because
interest rate contracts are highly traded among OTC market
participants, especially end-users, this Note examines how the
CFTC approaches the regulation.35
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the OTC
derivatives market. It introduces the different kinds of contracts
traded in the OTC market and elaborates on the type of risks
associated with the OTC market. Part III examines who qualifies
as an end-user and how they utilize the market. Part IV gives a
brief history of past regulation in the OTC derivative market. It
also introduces Title VII of Dodd–Frank and the requirements it
imposes on the OTC market, especially end-users.
Although it is vital that commercial end-users have the
ability to hedge risk with individualized contracts at minimized
costs, a narrow exception with minimal regulation is not in the
American public’s best interest. Part V introduces alternative
approaches to regulating OTC derivatives. This Note argues that
the regulation should exempt end-users, but that the current
requirements of end-users are not sufficient to meet Title VII’s
aims to promote transparency in the OTC market and to protect
the American public from systemic risk. This Note tackles the
question of how broad to make the end-user definition and how to
then regulate those falling within the definition. This Note
argues for a broader definition to accommodate the number of
users who cannot afford to participate in the market if subjected
to mandatory clearing requirements.36
Part VI proposes that end-users should comply with
stringent disclosure and reporting requirements in order not to
exacerbate another financial crisis. The proposed disclosure
model mirrors the ISDA’s Master Agreement, a standard form
agreement already used by a number of market participants.37
34. See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics
at End-June 2011, http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm (last visited Sept.
27, 2012) (providing a table of the amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives by
instrument) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See ISDA End-User Survey: Interest Rate Swaps (Oct. 2010),
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/end-user-surveys
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ISDA Survey: Interest Rate Swaps] (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30.
37. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (introducing the ISDA
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The goal is to strike a balance between a broad end-user
exemption and protecting the market from users abusing this
exception through speculation and highly leveraged bets. This
Note argues that such a balance is achievable so long as
regulators demand more disclosure of end-users, particularly in
regard to their ability to meet financial obligations. This will
promote transparency and allow regulators to easily monitor
abuse of the exception. While this Note acknowledges that the
rapidly changing face of financial innovation in the OTC
derivatives market makes it difficult for regulators to implement
an efficient regulatory scheme, this Note’s proposal could
nevertheless work by adapting disclosure requirements to
changes in financial innovation.
II. Over-the-Counter Derivative Market
A. Market Overview
A derivative contract is “a bilateral contract or payments
exchange agreement whose value derives . . . from the value of an
underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index.”38
Derivatives are traded in two kinds of markets: exchanges and
OTC markets.39 This Note focuses on the OTC market where
contracts are bilaterally negotiated collateral agreements with
flexible terms that mature over time.40
The OTC market consists of privately negotiated and traded
agreements.41 These market characteristics enable market
participants to tailor derivative contracts to their specific needs.42
Master Agreement).
38. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 159 (citing Procter & Gamble Co.
v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996)).
39. Randall Dodd, The Structure of OTC Derivatives Markets, 9 THE
FINANCIER 1, 1–4 (2002).
40. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 163 (listing the main points of
how exchange-traded and OTC markets differ).
41. See id. at 162–63 (discussing the difference between derivative
exchange markets, which are designed to eliminate counterparty risk by
standardizing contracts, and OTC markets, which increase counterparty risk
and illiquidity due to the contracts’ individualized terms).
42. See id. (describing how the flexibility of OTC contracts enables
participants to transact for what they need).
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This market appeals to commercial users hedging risk and
noncommercial investors speculating in the market to obtain
large profits.43 Although derivatives contracts allow participants
to obtain large arbitrage profits and hedge exposed risks, they
have a potentially large downside.
The resulting losses from Long Term Capital Management’s
(LTCM) failure in 1998 and the AIG bailout in 2008 revealed this
downside.44 These failures presented issues of counterparty credit
risk.45 AIG sold credit derivatives in the OTC market that
essentially insured corporate credit.46 AIG, a dealer of credit
default swaps, was able to undertake a great amount of exposure
in the OTC market by selling insurance on the risk of default
where the underlying asset was a mortgage-backed security.47
Unfortunately, such contracts required large payments to
counterparties when the subject of the credit default swap
worsened.48 With the decrease in credit ratings in 2008 due to the
downfall of the economy, AIG became responsible for posting
collateral to numerous outstanding credit default swap
contracts.49 Due to the multiple positions AIG held in credit
default swaps, the company could not meet all of the collateral
43. See, e.g., EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF
MARKET ABUSE 43 (2005) (listing why the derivatives market is attractive to
different users).
44. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 160–62 (discussing the systemic
risk effects of the failure of LTCM, Bear Stearns, and AIG due to their large
speculative positions in the OTC markets).
45. See id. (describing the effect of one party defaulting on its contract due
to failure and shifting the risk to the counterparty). This dislocation of risk has
a great impact on the market, and will likely create a ripple effect for the
economy as a whole. Id. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 87–88 (stating that AIG
underwrote approximately $80 billion in notional amount of credit default
swaps derived from mortgage-backed securities).
46. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 173–74 (providing a brief
overview of how AIG was able to insure multiple times the value of the
outstanding credit of the companies subject to the transaction). Market
participants use credit default swaps to transfer credit risk to another party at a
set cost. Id. at 179.
47. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 87–88 (discussing the role of OTC
derivatives and AIG in the 2008 financial crisis).
48. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 173–74.
49. See David A. Skeel & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and
the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 165–66 (2012)
(providing an overview of the role derivatives played in AIG’s bailout).
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demands and turned to the government to help meet its
obligations, avoiding a worse crisis than the nation was already
facing.50
Participants in the OTC market, especially major
participants and dealers, hold large positions.51 If one party was
to default, the loss endured by the counterparties to all of their
derivative contracts could disrupt market functioning.52 This fear
of disruption is exactly why the government intervened on
multiple occasions to bail out financial institutions and related
entities.53 While speculation is not normally pertinent to endusers, this Note proposes the idea that minimally regulated endusers could manipulate the exception and speculate while
claiming the hedging exemption.54 The general problem of
distinguishing between hedging and speculation is a difficult
task.55 In May 2012, JPMorgan Chase lost $2 billion over a six
week period in a trading portfolio used to hedge risks to which
the company exposed itself.56 This shows how transactions
designed to hedge exposed risk could seem like speculation and
result in large losses.57

50. See id. at 166 (stating that the only other alternative for AIG would
have been bankruptcy, which would have left the counterparties to the swap
transactions with no way to receive collateral payments).
51. See id. at 162 (stating that if the Federal Reserve did not facilitate the
private sector recapitalization, then counterparties’ losses could have been
somewhere from $3 billion to $5 billion).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 163–66.
54. See infra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing how the lack of
disclosure proposed by the end-user exception does not effectively enable
regulators to monitor the market for abuse of the exception).
55. See Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1097
(2000) (presenting the question of how to distinguish between allocation of risk
and gambling).
56. See Dawn Kopecki, Michael J. Moore, & Christine Harper, JPMorgan
Loses $2 Billion on Unit’s ‘Egregious Mistakes’ (May 11, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-11/jpmorgan-loses-2-billion-asmistakes-trounce-hedges.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. See id. (“Concern [is] ‘that a large, supposedly sophisticated institution,
even something called a ‘hedge’ can contain all kinds of hidden risks that the
senior people don’t understand.’”).

DO END-USERS GET THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS?

1769

Speculation in the derivatives market is a dangerous
endeavor because the market exposes investors to a large amount
of risk from highly leveraged bets.58 By imposing minimal
regulation on end-users, transparency in the market is not
achieved and bad actors can more easily hide trading activities
from regulators.59 This is why regulators should subject these
participants to more stringent disclosure and reporting
requirements.
Another common characteristic of derivatives is the amount
of leverage on which these instruments are traded. Leverage
allows one to make an investment with little or no upfront
monetary payment.60 In the OTC derivatives market, no
exchange of funds may be required until maturity or
performance.61 This enables an investor to hold exponentially
larger positions than the amount committed.62 Although, in
theory, this seems ideal because it reduces risk, in reality,
leverage amplifies risk by spreading and multiplying it among
multiple complex financial transactions, creating systemic
hazards.63
Because of these complex characteristics, derivatives can be
extremely dangerous, not only to the OTC market, but to the
economy as a whole. This potential danger stems largely from
“users’ lack of knowledge and their under appreciation of the
58. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and
Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L. J. 701, 772
(1999) (discussing how speculation in the derivatives market is sometimes cheap
and encourages investors to accept uncompensated risk). Stout introduces the
idea that derivatives speculation increases systemic risk because of the number
of financial firms exposing themselves to a great level of risk. Id.
59. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 165 (stating the importance that some
sort of regulatory framework exists to monitor those who could abuse the OTC
market and increase the threat of systemic risk).
60. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 164 (introducing the concept of
leverage and how it is beneficial to transactions in the derivatives market).
61. See id. (pointing out how an OTC derivative may not require any
advancement until maturity, whereas an exchange-traded derivative requires a
margin). See infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text for a description of
margin.
62. See Topham, supra note 4, at 139–40 (discussing how financial leverage
in the derivatives market can lead to an increased ability to take risks, therefore
raising the chances of failure and systemic risk).
63. Id. at 140.
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risks involved.”64 This factor caused a number of losses stemming
from derivatives use, including the economic crisis of 2008.65
B. Types of OTC Contracts
1. Options
An option contract gives “the purchaser the right to buy (call
option) or sell (put option) a specified quantity of a commodity or
financial asset at a particular price (exercise price) on or before a
certain future date.”66 Option contracts function by having the
purchaser pay the seller (writer) an option premium for the right
to buy or sell.67 The purchaser’s loss is limited to the price of the
premium, enabling the purchaser to limit the downside of
investment.68 In contrast, the seller of an option receives the
premium in return for risk exposure.69
Like other derivatives, options may serve as hedging and
speculating instruments, but, most importantly, options enable a
buyer to eliminate all downside risk by paying a premium
upfront.70 Options do not expose the owner of an option to market
risk because they create only a right to buy or sell, not an
obligation.71 Options do expose the seller to some risk associated

64. See Edward A. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivative
Use: Advocating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 595, 629 (2000) (introducing the use of derivatives and regulatory
structures applicable to derivatives in 2000).
65. See id. at 629–30 (stating how users’ lack of knowledge caused a
number of financial losses in the 1990s, but these losses resulted in few
lawsuits).
66. See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 27.
67. Id.
68. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 170–71 (discussing the operation
and use of options).
69. See id.
70. See id. (noting that downside risk of an option is shifted completely to
the seller).
71. See id. at 171 (explaining that the owner of an option is exposed to no
market risk and, if they choose not to exercise an option, then they only lose the
price of the premium).
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with the underlying asset.72 The seller can hedge this risk,
however, by investing in the underlying asset.73
2. Forwards
A forward contract “obligate[s] the holder to buy or sell a
specific underlying [asset] at a specified price, quantity, and date
in the future.”74 Forwards are customized contracts that allow
market participants to hedge assets and liabilities by locking in a
future purchase or sale price.75 For example, if a U.S. importer
plans to buy a product at a future date for a price quoted in a
foreign currency, the U.S. importer can enter into a forward
contract to fix the U.S. dollar cost of the product.76 This allows
the U.S. importer to hedge against currency fluctuations between
the purchase and delivery dates.77 Alternatively, market
participants use forwards to speculate on market movements and
profit from decreases or increases in future prices or rates.78
3. Swaps
A swap is a complex instrument traded on the OTC market.79
In a swap agreement, “two parties agree to exchange ‘cash flows’
on a ‘notional amount’ over a period of time in the future.”80 This
notional amount is a reference upon which the payment stream is

72. See id. (looking to how sellers of an option contract can limit their
exposure to market risk).
73. See id.
74. See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (defining a forward and describing
the instrument’s use in the market).
75. See id. at 26 (providing an example of how a hedging participant could
benefit from using a customized forward contract).
76. See id. at 5 (providing an example of how a party would utilize a
forward contract).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 27 (discussing how a speculator attempts to profit in the
forwards market).
79. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 172.
80. See id. (looking at swap agreements and discussing the characteristics
of such contracts).
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derived.81 A commonly transacted swap is the interest rate swap,
which allows counterparties to exchange a fixed rate for a floating
rate.82 For example, Party A invests in a bond with a par value of
$1000 and a fixed interest rate of 5% compounded annually.83
Party B, however, owns a bond that pays a floating interest rate
tied to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).84 Party B
may prefer a more steady interest payment to hedge against the
risk of a decreasing interest rate.85 Party A, however, may want
to trade his steady interest payment for a potentially larger
interest payment.86 If the two enter into an interest rate swap,
then Party A is guaranteed his annual interest payment of $50
plus any additional profit over $50 on the two bonds.87 Party B,
on the other hand, is always guaranteed $50.88 Party B pays any
amount over $50 to Party A, while Party A, in turn, compensates
Party B for any loss under $50.89
Because swaps are traded on the OTC market, parties can
negotiate a contract that specifically reflects their needs, whether

81. See id. at 175 (describing the elements of a swap transaction prior to an
overview of the types of swap transactions most frequently used in the market).
Common transactions include interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and creditdefault swaps. Id.
82. See id. at 175–77 (setting out how a “plain vanilla” interest rate swap
works and provides benefits to the counterparties); see also Gogel, supra note 5,
at 8–9 (providing a hypothetical example of how an interest rate swap works).
These described transactions are constructed similarly to other swap contracts.
Id.
83. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 8–9 (depicting this example).
84. See id. (Party B has a floating interest rate payment and wants to
guarantee a specific payment so he transacts with Party A, who wishes to
increase his guaranteed payment). For a description of LIBOR, see British
Banking Ass’n, Understanding BBA LIBOR, (Jan. 8, 2011), http://
www.bba.org.uk/media/article/understanding-bba-libor (last visited Sept. 27,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). LIBOR is the London
Interbank Offered Rate, which reflects the rate at which banks, such as the U.S.
Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, borrow money from one
another daily. Id.
85. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 8–9.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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to hedge exposed credit risk from an owned asset or to profit by
speculating on pricing inefficiencies in the market.90
Swaps enable extreme flexibility to meet the contracting
parties’ needs, but, concurrently, expose these parties to high
credit risk.91 Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty to the
transaction will default on the contract.92 Ideally, credit risk is
reflected in the contractual terms, but, due to information
asymmetry, this is not always achievable.93 AIG’s issuance of
multiple credit default swaps and inability to meet financial
obligations when they became due provides a picture of how
asymmetrical information can have damaging effects.94 After the
2008 financial crisis, regulators set out to address these risks and
pricing inefficiencies within the OTC swap market.95 The next
portion of this Note examines commercial end-users’ role in the
swap market and how proposed legislation may affect their
participation.
III. End-User Participation in the OTC Market
End-users are a category of market participants that utilize
the OTC market to hedge exposed market risk and minimize
volatility of their overall earnings.96 This category mainly
90. See Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative
Contracts as Collateral, 57 BUS. LAW. 1127, 1132 (2002) (explaining that OTC
derivatives are used for both speculation and hedging, but they are more
commonly used for hedging purposes).
91. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 172.
92. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 64, at 663 (providing a description of
credit risk and how to manage it).
93. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing how lack of transparency in
the market and nondisclosure between counterparties leaves regulators and
participants unaware of potential risks building up in the financial market).
This is a problem that Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Act aims to address. See
Schapiro, supra note 17, at 165.
94. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text for a brief overview of
the AIG bailout.
95. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 164 (discussing the goals of Dodd–
Frank with respect to regulating the OTC derivate market).
96. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES: A TRANSACTION APPROACH 10 (Jonathan
Denton ed., 2006) (“Derivatives are typically used by corporate end users to
reduce or extinguish their exposure to discrete risks and thus reduce the
volatility of their earnings.”); Adams & Runkle, supra note 64, at 674 (“When
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includes nonfinancial corporations, but asset managers and other
financial institutions also qualify.97 These users, and their
investors, benefit greatly from using the OTC market to hedge
risk.
For example, Shell Co. takes positions in the U.S. energy
derivatives market to respond to internal forecasts of supply and
demand, enabling Shell to be ahead of foreseeable price
movements.98 It also participates in the swap market to offset
credit risk and assist actual transactions.99 Kraft Foods employs
risk management strategies to handle risks associated with
volatility in interest rates, commodity prices, and foreign
currency rates that entail entering into forward, option, and swap
contracts.100
Although a positive duty to hedge exposed risks may not
exist, at least one court found that the board of directors of a
company owes its shareholders a duty of care to instruct
managers adequately about the use of hedging with
derivatives.101 Such a ruling demonstrates that hedging in the
derivatives market is a common practice among corporations, and
it is in a board’s best interest to examine whether it is beneficial
for a corporation to take this risk management route.102

properly used to hedge against risk, derivatives are an essential corporate
tool.”).
97. See ISDA Survey: Interest Rate Swaps, supra note 35 (providing a list of
categories of survey respondents).
98. See Letter from Robert Reilley, Vice President – Regulatory Affairs,
Shell Energy North Am. (US), L.P., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y of the Comm’n,
CFTC (June 21, 2011) [hereinafter Shell Letter] (listing the ways in which Shell
Co. utilizes the derivative market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
99. See id.
100. See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30 (describing how Kraft Foods and
its affiliate companies utilize the derivative market).
101. See Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E. 2d 587, 591–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(concluding that the board of directors failed “to attain knowledge of the basic
fundamentals of hedging to be able to direct the hedging activities and supervise
the manager properly”).
102. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 96, at 13 (discussing the court’s
finding in Brane v. Roth and a corporation’s duty to hedge or, at a minimum,
look to the mechanics of such a trade to determine if it is within the best
interests of the corporation).
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Companies, as mentioned previously, use the derivative market
to manage risk and optimize value.103
The OTC market enables end-users to tailor their derivative
contracts to their needs.104 High negotiation costs of OTC
derivatives contracts makes trading on the market costly.105 But
this is the price end-users pay for a uniquely tailored contract.
Prior to Dodd–Frank, participants in the market enjoyed the
added benefit of no margin requirements.106
According to a 2010 International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) survey, end-users stated that they use the
OTC derivatives market primarily for interest rate swaps,
currency swaps, credit default swaps, equity swaps, and energy
swaps.107 The results show that 80% use the OTC market for
interest rate swaps, 59% for currency swaps, 27% for credit
default swaps, 25% for equity swaps, and 32% for
energy/commodity swaps.108 The ISDA classified end-users as
companies utilizing the market to manage exposed risk.109 The
group included nonfinancial corporations, asset managers, and
other financial institutions.110 These instruments are so widely
103. See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30; see also Shell Letter, supra note
98 (discussing for what purposes Shell uses the derivative market and how the
proposed end-user definition will affect Shell’s ability to utilize the market via
its subsidiary companies).
104. See Thomas C. Singher, Note, Regulating Derivatives: Does
Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to
Congressional Action?, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1397, 1406–08 (1995) (addressing
the uses of the derivatives market to commercial users). One of the uses
discussed is speculation, which, although not common for end-users, supports an
argument to regulate these participants in some fashion. Id. at 1410–11.
105. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that swap contracts tend to have
high transaction costs due to the extensive negotiations over delivering a party’s
specific needs).
106. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text for a description on
Dodd–Frank’s margin requirements.
107. See ISDA Survey: Interest Rate Swaps, supra note 35, at 2 (listing
results from a survey of 295 respondents from North America and Europe who
use the OTC derivatives market).
108. See id.
109. See id. The ISDA study includes more than just nonfinancial entities
utilizing the OTC market for hedging exposed risks. Id. This Note proposes that
the regulatory definition of end-user should include those surveyed as end-users
by the ISDA.
110. See id.
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used because companies across all industries utilize interest rate
swaps and currency swaps.111 Specific industries utilize
commodity, equity, and credit derivatives.112 For example,
financial industries primarily use equity and credit derivatives,
while companies focusing on utilities and basic materials utilize
commodity derivatives.113
Because end-users typically use the OTC market specifically
for hedging exposed market risk, Congress excluded these users
from regulation under Title VII of Dodd–Frank.114 If mandatory
clearing pertained to end-users, they would be required to post
margin and use clearinghouses for all of their trades.115 This
would increase the cost of using the OTC market and drive many
end-users away from the market. As a result, corporate end-users
would hedge their risks in nonbeneficial ways, such as through
insurance contracts that increase transaction costs, which the
corporation passes on to the consumers and investors.116
Although increased costs will drive end-users from the
market, imposing minimal regulation for end-users is not the
proper solution. It is possible that end-users are attracted to the
market not only because of low transaction costs, but also because
of the lack of regulation. Although most end-users are utilizing
the market for hedging purposes, misusing these instruments is
easy due to their complexity and large potential gains.117 For
111. See ISDA NEWS RELEASE, supra note 26, at 2 (breaking down results of
a 2009 survey of end-user participation in the OTC derivative market by
industry and country).
112. See id. at 4 (displaying a chart of the survey results broken down by
industry sector and usage of each type of swap contract).
113. See id.
114. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 189 (explaining that Congress’s rationale
for excluding end-users from regulation stemmed from concerns for consumers
who would suffer through increased costs due to corporations’ inability to hedge
risk and reduce overall losses).
115. See Dodd–Frank § 723, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h); infra Part IV.B (discussing Title
VII of Dodd–Frank).
116. See Letter from Sen. Christopher Dodd & Sen. Blanche Lincoln to Rep.
Barney Frank & Rep. Colin Peterson (June 30, 2010) (stating Congress’s
intention in exempting end-users from the market) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
117. See Guinn & Harvey, supra note 90, at 1128, 1130 (commenting on the
possibility of abuse in the market due to some participant’s lack of knowledge of
the complex OTC derivatives).
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example, one claiming the end-user exception could determine a
way to abuse the exception by disguising speculation as hedging
and increasing the threat of systemic risk.118 Does exemption from
Dodd–Frank mandatory clearing provide end-users the best of
both worlds—virtually no regulation and low transaction costs?
This Note will analyze whether it is possible to broaden the class of
end-users and keep the derivatives market attractive to end-users
by maintaining low transaction costs.
IV. Regulation of the OTC Market
A. Past Regulation
Before introducing the current regulation of the OTC market,
it is important to discuss briefly the evolution of regulation in the
derivatives market, specifically of OTC derivatives. The regulatory
framework of the derivatives market is a combination of the CFTC,
the SEC, and a number of self-regulatory institutions.119 Although
traders utilized OTC derivatives for a long period of time, the
market rose to popularity in the 1980s.120 Due to regulators’
unfamiliarity with these new, complex instruments, OTC
derivatives remained largely unregulated for some time.121
Originally, regulators focused on preventing manipulation and
fraud in the derivatives market.122 Because OTC derivatives are
less susceptible to manipulation, regulators did not see these
instruments as a threat deserving of regulation.123 Unfortunately,

118. See infra Part VI.
119. See Adam J. Krippel, Note, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives
Market: The Costs, Risks and Politics, 6 ENTREPREN. BUS. L. J. 269, 278 (2011)
(providing an overview of regulation in the derivatives market).
120. See Gary Gensler Testimony, supra note 7 (addressing why the OTC
market was unregulated prior to 2008).
121. See Krippel, supra note 119, at 278.
122. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 18–23 (discussing the history of derivative
regulation from the passage of the CEA in 1936 to the creation of the CFTC in
1974). Congress attempted to address issues of fraud and manipulation of the
unregulated market. Id. Ultimately, this led to exempting the OTC derivatives
from regulations in the 1992 amendments to the CEA, which attracted many
critics. Id. at 23.
123. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-00-00, COMMODITY
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the 1992 amendments to the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA), which governs regulation of the derivatives market, did
not completely resolve this issue.124 The 1992 amendments gave
the CFTC power to exempt OTC derivatives from regulation.125
Regulators justified nonregulation with the fact that participants
were self-interested and sufficiently sophisticated to selfregulate.126
Because government regulators failed to address issues
beyond manipulation and fraud, private regulators began
appearing in the 1990s to increase market transparency and
disclosure.127 In 1994, the Derivatives Policy Group introduced a
voluntary oversight framework that would help address the
public policy issues of the OTC derivatives market.128 Its goal was
to have more OTC market participants report their use and risk
exposure in the market.129
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the
ISDA have made progress in making the derivatives market more
transparent and efficient.130 The ISDA uses a form document,
known as the ISDA Master Agreement, which parties sign prior
to entering into any derivatives contract.131 The ISDA Master
EXCHANGE ACT – ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING
SYSTEMS 10 (2009) (discussing how the OTC derivatives market remained
unregulated because the instruments presented limited market integrity
concerns).
124. See id. Because the OTC derivative market was not as susceptible to
fraud and manipulation, regulators were not concerned with subjecting them to
regulation. See id. at 28.
125. See id.
126. See Gary Gensler Testimony, supra note 7.
127. See Singher, supra note 104, at 1431–34 (looking at all the different
private actors who have taken steps to help promote efficiency and transparency
in the OTC market).
128. See generally Derivatives Policy Group, Framework for Voluntary
Oversight, http://riskinstitute.ch/137790.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012)
(presenting an approach to enhance reporting and evaluation of risk in the OTC
market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See id.
130. See Singher, supra note 104, at 1431–33 (discussing additional
regulatory influences on the OTC derivatives market beyond statutory
guidelines).
131. See Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four
Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation? 5–6 (San Diego Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 39, 2002) (introducing the ISDA and how it
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Agreement specifies a number of things, including the obligations
of the parties and the relevant events of default.132 If the
standard form contract is unfavorable to one party, it can either
negotiate this term in each of its contracts or accept the standard
terms.133 This practice promotes efficiency for members, and the
documents further provide guidance in judicial decisions.134
While private groups were encouraging self-regulation, some
advocated for statutory regulation of the OTC market.135 Though
OTC derivatives did not pose a risk of manipulation in the late
1990s when the argument to regulate was introduced, some saw
that the rapidly changing structure of this market and the recent
large losses in the market required a regulatory response.136 The
Government Financial Officers Association presented the idea
that derivatives posed a bigger threat than the benefit they
offered.137 Most notably, Brooksley Born, Commissioner of the
CFTC from 1996–1999, testified before Congress on the perils
that the derivatives market posed and how regulators should
address these dangers:138

privately regulates the OTC derivatives market).
132. See id. at 6 (outlining what the ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule
specifies to reduce counterparty risk).
133. See Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group
Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 254 (2001) (presenting the downside to using the
ISDA standard form contract).
134. See id. at 6–10 (presenting the idea that the ISDA’s private law,
addressing issues unanticipated by judges and regulators, will continue to be
used in judicial opinions).
135. See CFTC Concept Release, Over-the-Counter Derivatives (May 7,
1998), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012)
(proposing a regulatory scheme for the OTC market) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). This proposal was opposed by financial
regulators, Greenspan and Rubin, who essentially stated that such regulation
would cause a financial crisis. See Krippel, supra note 119, at 279 (discussing
the negative reaction to Brooksley Born’s regulatory proposal).
136. See Financial Derivatives Supervisory Improvement Act of 1998 and the
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: Hearing on H.R. 4062 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 177 (1998) (statement of
Brooksley Born, Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4062].
137. See GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASSOC., 1994 SURVEY OF DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS
IN THE DEBT MARKET 124 (1994).
138. See Hearing on H.R. 4062, supra note 136, at 313.
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Failure to keep pace with the changing market would stifle the
capacity of U.S. firms to meet global competitive challenges,
would create a cloud of legal uncertainty over the applicability
of outdated rules to new products and innovative transactions,
and would erode the regulatory system’s ability to protect
customers and to preserve the financial integrity of that
market.139

Her proposal considered the clearing of derivatives, OTC
derivatives market users’ registration and reporting to the CFTC,
capital requirements, requirement of risk management controls
for derivatives dealers, and restrictions on dealers’ sale
practices.140 This idea met strong opposition from other
regulators who believed that regulation would hinder the
efficiency of the OTC derivative market.141
Born’s fear became real in 2008. But, in 1999, proponents for
deregulation won the day in Congress. Alan Greenspan, then
Federal Reserve Chairman, claimed that the proposed regulatory
scheme would “distort the efficiency of [the U.S.] market system
and as a consequence [impede] growth and improvements in
standards of living.”142
With Greenspan’s encouragement, Congress rejected
regulation of OTC derivatives and passed the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).143 With this Act, Congress
ensured that the CFTC would not regulate OTC derivatives by
expressly exempting them from the CFMA legislation.144
Essentially, the CFMA’s goal was to promote innovation, enhance
legal certainty, and provide greater stability in the derivatives

139. Id.
140. See CFTC Concept Release, supra note 135.
141. See Hearing on the Regulation of OTC Derivatives Before the H. Comm.
on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 303 (1998) (testimony of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve).
142. See id.
143. See Reade Everett, Deriving a Solution for Derivative Reform: Proposals
to Reconstruct the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 479, 483 (2009).
144. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(g)(1) (2010) (exempting agreements entered into by
eligible contract participants that are “subject to individual negotiation by
parties”).
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market.145 As a result, private parties could negotiate OTC
derivatives contracts without being subject to any regulation.146
Some feel that perhaps Born and Greenspan were both
wrong in their regulatory endeavors. Lynn Stout argues that the
deregulation of derivatives led to disaster by making swap
contracts legally enforceable through the CFMA, which was
unprecedented.147 Stout proposes a form of self-regulation that
would hold dealers personally responsible for risky, speculative
decisions, by making speculative OTC contracts not legally
enforceable.148 This is how the law viewed derivatives contracts
prior to 2000 and Stout believes this is the best way to regulate
now.149 In essence, Lynn Stout’s answer is to treat an OTC swap
contract as a gambling contract, just as it was once done
centuries ago.150 This Note will address this idea further in Part
V.B.1.
B. Dodd–Frank Regulation
For years, regulators recognized that the OTC market lacked
oversight.151 In 1994, the Comptroller General of the United
States called for uniform regulation of the OTC market.152 In
145. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 24 (discussing the intention and effect of the
CFMA).
146. See id. (stating the result of deregulation in the OTC market). Gogel
introduces the idea that deregulation of OTC transactions directly contrasts
with the intention of the CFMA to promote transparency, decrease systemic
risk, and provide stability in the market. Id.
147. See Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 6, at 30 (“[The] rule of
unenforceability encouraged speculators to rely on private ordering and to
develop and police their own private markets.”).
148. See id.
149. See id; Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them,
BANKING & FINANCE 34 (Fall 2009) [hereinafter Regulate OTC Derivatives]
(proposing an idea to treat speculative contracts as gambling contracts to give
dealers more accountability for their actions).
150. See Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives, supra note 149, at 34–35; see
infra notes 196–99.
151. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 31–32 (“On October 8, 2008, Christopher
Cox, then Chairman of the SEC, characterized the lack of oversight of the OTC
derivatives market as a ‘regulatory black hole.’”).
152. See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 126–27 (“Given the weaknesses and
gaps that impede regulatory preparedness for dealing with a crisis associated
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1998, Brooksley Born reaffirmed the importance of regulating
this vast market.153 Unfortunately, the government did not act to
regulate the OTC market until it was too late.
Title VII of Dodd–Frank addresses the regulation of the OTC
derivatives market, particularly swaps.154 The legislation’s
overall goal is to lower risk to the American public and to
promote transparency in the OTC market.155 The major rules that
the CFTC and SEC are currently promulgating are set out below.
Dodd–Frank gives the CFTC and the SEC jurisdiction over
swap regulation.156 The SEC has jurisdiction over security-based
swaps and the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over all
nonsecurities based swaps, including interest rate swaps and
currency swaps.157 Dodd–Frank requires the CFTC to coordinate
with the SEC and other agencies prior to issuing rules or orders
in connection with swap regulation.158 Dodd–Frank also
mandates that the CFTC and SEC engage in joint rulemaking to
define terms, including “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap
dealer,” and “major swap participant.”159
One of the major changes that Dodd–Frank imposes on the
OTC market is the mandatory clearing of swaps.160 This
regulatory approach requires all qualifying swaps to be traded
through a heavily regulated third-party, called a derivatives
clearing organization (DCO).161 This aims to reduce systemic risk
with derivatives, we recommend that Congress require federal regulation of the
safety and soundness of all major U.S. OTC derivatives dealers.”).
153. See Hearing on H.R. 4062, supra note 136, at 177–78.
154. See id. at 40 (introducing different sections of the Financial Reform Act
and what each section aims to regulate).
155. See OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Discussion Draft: Hearing
Before H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 2, 5 (2009) (statement of Gary
Gensler, Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009
Hearing].
156. Dodd–Frank Act § 722(a).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 712.
159. Id. § 712(d)(1). The definitions of these terms are finalized. See 77 Fed.
Reg. 30596 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
160. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 48–50 (looking at the costs and benefits of
derivatives clearing).
161. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 86–87 (discussing approaches to managing
counterparty risk and the effects of these approaches, specifically the central
clearing requirement).
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by putting OTC transactions on the books of regulated
clearinghouses and not large financial institutions.162 Central
clearing also aims to reduce counterparty risk, leading to more
accurate pricing.163
Central clearing will require participants, with some
exceptions, to set initial margin requirements.164 Margin is a cash
balance in a trader’s account with the clearinghouse.165 If the
balance in this account falls below a certain amount, the trader
must post additional collateral to maintain a balance established
by the clearinghouse.166 A portion of the contract settlement
amount determines the margin requirement.167 This guarantees
that parties back up investments with an adequate amount of
capital.168 Due to uncertainty in derivatives pricing and
fluctuation of an underlying asset’s price, a trader may be
required to post a considerable amount of collateral.169 While
providing upfront collateral is important, it is an incredibly
thorny topic because of the difficulty in pricing derivatives and
determining an accurate settlement price on which to base a
margin calculation.170

162. See OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 155, at 4
(addressing how the clearing organizations will help to lower risk to the
American public).
163. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 92 (explaining how the DCO in the OTC
market will overcome counterparty risk by providing an example). Although the
DCO is designed to eliminate counterparty risk and increase transparency, the
use of a central party clearing may increase costs in obtaining information that
in the current bilateral framework is not public. Id. at 94.
164. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 185 (providing an overview of central party
clearing in the OTC market).
165. See id. at 185 n.74 (explaining briefly the basics of margin).
166. See id.
167. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 50 (explaining the purpose of margin
requirements).
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Letter from Darrel E. Issa, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve (July 22, 2011),
http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/IssaLetter.pdf (stating that
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimates that the initial
margin posted in one year will total $2.56 trillion).
170. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 105–06 (examining the problems collateral
requirements may pose for OTC market users).
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These regulations apply only to swap dealers and major
participants.171 Congress’s goal in enacting this section of Dodd–
Frank was to guarantee that margin and collateral requirements
would not hinder end-users who utilize the market for pure
hedging purposes.172 Congress wanted these participants to use
funds for business investment and job creation, rather than
margin requirements.173 Determining which participants utilize
the market for these reasons and, consequently, whom to exempt
from regulation is a problem.174 The next portion of this Note
examines the end-user exception, which carries out this goal of
Congress.
V. End-User Exception to the Mandatory Clearing of Swaps
Dodd–Frank gives the CFTC authority to adopt rules
exempting certain swaps from the clearing mandate.175 Aiming to
protect the American public by regulating systemic risk in the
OTC market, the CFTC promulgated a rule defining the enduser.176

171. See Dodd–Frank § 723(a)(3); Gogel, supra note 5, at 45–46 (discussing
the Dodd–Frank regulations of the OTC swap market).
172. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Blanche Lincoln) (stating that the legislation may not require some OTC market
users to post margin, it will require them to satisfy public reporting
requirements as set out in Dodd–Frank).
173. See John Carney, Will the CFTC Kill the End User Exemption?, CNBC
NETNET (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39506763/Will_The_CFTC_
Kill_The_End_User_Exemption (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (discussing whether
the CFTC has the authority to subject end-users to margin requirements) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
174. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 194 (“[T]he most problematic part of
policing the end-user exemption . . . is distinguishing when an end-user is
‘hedging or mitigating commercial risk’ rather than taking a speculative
position in derivatives markets.”).
175. See End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg.
80747 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (“[T]he Dodd–
Frank Act provides the Commission with the authority to adopt rules governing
the end-user clearing exception and to prescribe rules, issue interpretations, or
request information from persons claiming the end-user clearing exception
necessary to prevent abuse of the exception.”).
176. See id.
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The end-user exception is limited to nonfinancial entities and
does not completely eliminate their transactions from
regulation.177 A nonfinancial entity includes users who do not
hold investment positions for profit in the OTC market.178 The
rule disqualifies any swap used for any speculative or trading
purposes, or if used to hedge another swap.179 The rule requires
that a nonfinancial entity claiming exempt status must disclose
to the Commission its intention of claiming the exemption and
how it generally plans to meet financial obligations.180 Some
commenting on the proposed rule feel this regulation is
burdensome and will not effectively increase price transparency
in the swap market.181 Companies, like Shell, argue that overly
aggressive regulation could undermine efficiencies appreciated in
the OTC market and could distort pricing without promoting
transparency.182
A. Rule Design: Narrow Versus Broad
By passing Title VII of Dodd–Frank, Congress wanted to
increase transparency in the OTC market and decrease the
threat of systemic risk.183 Regulators aim to promote public
transparency in addition to transparency to regulators.184 The
CFTC hopes that public transparency will improve the function of
the OTC market, much as it has existing securities and futures
177. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(i) (as amended by
Dodd–Frank).
178. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(C)(i) (providing a list of what users qualify as a
financial entity).
179. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747 (explaining that the Commission finds all swaps
held for appreciation in value to be speculative).
180. See id. (proposing that end-users notify the Commission each time the
clearing exception is elected by providing specified information as set out in the
swap data recordkeeping and reporting rules).
181. See Shell Letter, supra note 98, at 5 (explaining how compliance with
data reporting for end-users will not provide an accurate portrayal of one’s
exposure in the market).
182. See id. at 2 (stating that real time reporting requirements for swaps
between an affiliate and a corporation do not promote the aims of Dodd–Frank).
183. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 166.
184. See Gary Gensler Testimony, supra note 7 (discussing the Dodd–Frank
legislation and what it aims to promote in the OTC market).
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markets.185 Although Title VII of Dodd–Frank regulates the vast
and dangerous OTC market, Congress did not want the SEC and
CFTC to regulate certain users.
The end-user exception rule allows for commercial end-users
to utilize the OTC derivatives market without the added cost of
margin requirements and central clearing.186 Section 2(h)(7) of
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), as amended by Dodd–
Frank, provides:
[T]hat a swap otherwise subject to mandatory clearing is
subject to an elective exception from clearing if one party to
the swap is not a financial entity, is using swaps to hedge or
mitigate commercial risk, and notifies the Commission, in a
manner set forth by the Commission, how it generally meets
its financial obligations associated with entering into noncleared swaps.187

Commentators to the end-user exception raised questions
pertaining to a participant who does not qualify as a nonfinancial
entity, but (a) cannot afford to meet hedging requirements, such
as small banks, which are not systemically significant, and (b)
uses the OTC market to hedge or mitigate risk, such as
corporations’ affiliate companies.188 These commentators were
concerned that they would not qualify for the end-user exemption
and therefore must comply with mandatory clearing
requirements or leave the market.189
In response to these concerns, Congress introduced a bill that
would require the CFTC to exempt inter-affiliate swaps from
mandatory clearing.190 Inter-affiliate swaps are swaps that have
185. See id.
186. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747.
187. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7) (as amended by Dodd–
Frank).
188. See Letter from Nat’l Rural Util. Cooperative Fin. Corp., to David A.
Stawick, Secretary of the Comm’n, CFTC (Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter NRUCFC
Letter] (addressing the issue of small financial entities utilizing the OTC
market for reasons and in ways far different from large financial lenders, which
would justify the small lenders inclusion in the end-user exception) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30, at
9 (arguing that affiliate corporations, formed to act as a centralized hedging
center to hedge exposed risk for an entire corporate group, should be included in
the CFTC’s end-user definition).
189. See id.
190. See To Exempt Inter-affiliate Swaps from Certain Regulatory
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a corporation on one side of the transaction and, on the other
side, a party that is controlled or under common control of the
corporation that is a counterparty to the transaction.191 This bill
has yet to be enacted and may force the CFTC to broaden its
narrowly proposed definition.
The problem this poses is that the current design of the rule
does not support a broad end-user definition. The CFTC defines
end-user to include more participants, such as small banks, but
does not subject the users to more regulatory requirements.
Congress’s intention is to exempt end-users from the mandatory
clearing of swaps to maintain low transaction costs, but imposing
minimal regulatory requirements only hampers regulators’
efforts in creating a more transparent market.192 This Note
argues that more disclosure is necessary for the end-users
exempted from the mandatory clearing of swaps.
B. Alternative Rule Design
Based on the difficulty of pricing derivatives, the complexity
of calculating margin requirements, and the uncertainty of
financial innovation, can regulators effectively increase market
transparency and decrease systemic risk in the OTC derivative
market? This Note argues that more disclosure will help increase
transparency, but that regulators will have difficulty in
maintaining transparency with the ever changing land scape of
financial innovation.

Requirements Put in Place by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 2779, 112th Cong. __(2012) (introduced on Aug.
1, 2011 and currently extended for further consideration ending as of Mar. 8,
2012).
191. See James Hamilton, House Ag Committee Approves Legislation
Exempting Inter-Affiliate Swaps from Dodd–Frank Derivatives Requirements,
Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation (Sept. 27, 2012, 2:44 PM),
http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/house-ag-committee-exempts-inter.
html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
192. See infra Part V.B.1.
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1. Alternative Approaches to OTC Derivatives Regulation
The CFMA’s deregulation of the OTC derivatives market
proved ineffective, as it is alleged to be a cause of the 2008
financial crisis.193 By flying under the radar of regulators, the
OTC market grew to an extraordinary size within the years
leading up to the financial crisis.194 Title VII of Dodd–Frank aims
to protect the American public from the systemic risk that the
OTC market poses by increasing transparency and disclosure in
the market.195 Part IV.B. and Part V examine Title VII’s efforts to
achieve these goals. This Note now introduces alternative,
perhaps better, approaches to derivatives regulation.
First, as mentioned in Part IV.A, Lynn Stout proposes that
regulators should treat OTC derivatives contracts as gambling
contracts.196 Traditionally, speculative derivatives contracts were
legally unenforceable wagers.197 Stout argues that because
derivatives are technically bets on future market conduct, it
makes sense for regulators to treat these contracts as gambling
contracts.198 It encourages participants to be more careful in
choosing counterparties and to take responsibility for their
bets.199
Second, voluntary reporting institutions, such as the ISDA
and the Derivatives Policy Group mentioned in Part IV.B., allow
193. See Topham, supra note 4, at 147–49 (discussing how the CFMA’s
deregulation of derivatives resulted in participants not being aware of the
underlying risks associated with these instruments).
194. See id. at 148 (stating the notional amount of the derivatives market
was estimated at $604 trillion in 2009, with major commercial banks holding
positions that totaled $204 million).
195. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 164 (listing the aims of the Dodd–Frank
legislation).
196. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (introducing Lynn
Stout’s theory on regulating derivatives as gambling contracts).
197. See Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives, supra note 149, at 30 (discussing
how derivatives were regulated prior to the passage of the CFMA in 2000).
198. See id. at 30–31 (stating that, for centuries, speculative derivative
contracts were treated as legally non-enforceable contracts just as gambling
contracts due to the level of risk in the bet).
199. See id. at 32 (presenting the idea that speculative participants in the
derivatives market are encouraged to choose counterparties wisely and to create
a private market on which speculative participants trade, therefore minimizing
systemic risk).
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for participants to trade under standardized contracts.200 This
enables a more concrete report of activity in the OTC market.201
These institutions have made progress in reducing counterparty
risk, but unfortunately could not prevent the 2008 financial
crisis.202
A third approach would regulate the conduct of users and not
the specific instruments.203 This view looks to the major issues of
the OTC market that regulators must address, namely
counterparty risk and financial innovation.204 This approach
seems similar to Dodd–Frank in that the legislation carves out an
exception for end-users who utilize the market for hedging and
requires speculators in the market to meet collateral
requirements and mandatory clearing.205
The final regulatory method builds on the last approach. It
proposes that regardless of the conduct of the participant, all
participants should adhere to disclosure requirements greater
than just checking a box, as the current proposed rule sets out for
end-users.206 The CFTC must set more stringent disclosure
requirements so regulators can monitor the market for abuse of
the end-user exception.207 Regulators should require end-users to
200. See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text for an introduction of
these institutions and their policy goals.
201. See id.
202. See Symposium, Regulatory Reform and the Future of the U.S.
Financial System: An Examination of Dodd–Frank Regulation: Panel 1:
Derivative Regulation, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 439, 448–51 (2011) (discussing
ISDA contracts and their use in the OTC market).
203. See Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The
Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC
Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 414 (1999) (introducing the idea to
regulate OTC derivatives by conduct, i.e. speculation and hedging, and not by
the type of instrument).
204. See id. at 412–15 (regulating conduct helps address major concerns of
the OTC market while “achiev[ing] a balance between market efficiency and
market integrity”).
205. See supra Part V.A.
206. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747; Letter from Michael Greenberger, Professor,
Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, to David A. Stawick, Sec., CFTC (Feb. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter Greenberger Letter] (proposing to the CFTC that the end-user
exception rule should enhance disclosure requirements to be more effective and
align with the aims of Dodd–Frank).
207. See Greenberger Letter, supra note 206, at 3 (stating that a “check-thebox” approach is inadequate because it does not give regulators the proper
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give more specific detail of how they will meet financial
obligations, rather than just a general overview as the rule
suggests.208 By adding this disclosure and other reporting
requirements that provide a detailed outline of how end-users are
hedging risk, regulators would be aware if end-users are
adequately mitigating risk and not abusing the exception with
speculation.209
VI. Amendment to the End-User Exception
The mandatory clearing of swaps aims to protect the
American public from a financial crisis like that of 2008, but
exempting end-users from other forms of regulation does not
entirely meet the goals of Dodd–Frank. Exempting end-users
from mandatory clearing is necessary for corporations to run
their businesses effectively and efficiently by minimizing any
potential devastating downside risk that could harm
consumers.210 Additionally, if regulators require end-users to post
margin and collateral, then the additional cost incurred would
most likely be transferred to the consumer.211 This Note proposes
that the CFTC amend the end-user exception to apply to a
broader number of participants and, in doing so, require more
stringent disclosure similar to that of the ISDA Master
Agreement.

information to monitor whether end-users are abusing the exception).
208. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747. See also Greenberger Letter, supra note 206.
209. See Letter from Americans for Fin. Reform to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec., SEC (Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Am. for Fin. Reform Letter] (presenting a
proposal for enhanced disclosure and reporting for end-users claiming the
exception to the mandatory clearing of swaps) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Greenberger Letter, supra note 206.
210. Christine Cuccia, Informational Asymmetry and OTC Transactions:
Understanding the Need to Regulate Derivatives, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 197, 198
(1997) (discussing the ways in which corporations utilize the OTC market to
hedge risk).
211. See Katharine Rose, Annuity Issuers Eye Dodd–Frank Act, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER/ LIFE & HEALTH FIN. SERV., Vol. 114 Issue 16, 12 (Aug. 23, 2010)
(addressing concerns of insurers, such as MetLife and Harvard Financial
Services Group, that an increased price of using derivatives would result in high
costs to customers using financial services).
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A. Proposal for End-User Disclosure
Before this Note proposes how the CFTC should model endusers’ disclosure requirements, it will briefly discuss why the
other alternative approaches in Part V.B.1. do not sufficiently
address the concerns posed by the OTC market. First, Lynn
Stout’s theory to view OTC speculative contracts as gambling
contracts does not meet the aims of Dodd–Frank. This approach
would encourage investors to take responsibility for their risky
behavior by making them individually responsible for any losses
incurred on the contract.212 Unfortunately, this may not decrease
systemic risk and promote transparency because it keeps
regulators uninformed about market activity. Also, regulators
have a difficult task in dissecting the difference between
speculative and legitimate hedging contracts.213 Due to the
market disruption that OTC derivatives allegedly caused in 2008,
regulators cannot ignore the threat the market poses and must do
more than just make derivatives legally unenforceable.
The second approach to have nongovernmental institutions,
such as the ISDA and the Derivatives Policy Group, continue in
their efforts of promoting efficiency and transparency in the OTC
market could be successful. Dodd–Frank focuses on the United
States’ regulation of the OTC market, and not necessarily the
international market, as do these other groups.214 While these
institutions have made extraordinary improvement in the OTC
market, it was not sufficient to prevent the 2008 crisis.215
The third and fourth approaches introduced in Part V.B.1
combine to make the best approach to regulating OTC
derivatives, specifically end-users. This Note advocates
maintaining an exemption of end-users from the mandatory
clearing of swaps because they are not engaging in purely
212. See Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives, supra note 149, at 31–32.
213. See Kreitner, supra note 55, at 1135–36 (introducing the idea that the
increasing popularity of OTC derivatives caused much discussion on the
difficulty in distinguishing investment from gambling).
214. See generally Derivatives Policy Group, supra note 128; ISDA, ISDA
2011
BROCHURE,
available
at
Safe,
Efficient
Markets,
ISDA
http://www.isda.org/uploadfiles/_docs/ISDA_Brochure_2011.pdf (explaining the
ISDA’s purpose and who it aims to serve).
215. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing a number of suggested
theories of how OTC derivatives contributed to the 2008 financial crisis).
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speculative behavior. This mirrors the approach of regulating
behavior in contrast to regulating a particular instrument.216 This
Note proposes that the CFTC should define end-user broadly to
enable more bona-fide hedging participants to claim the
exemption. A broader exception would allow more users to
effectively hedge against exposed risks for low transaction costs.
The more broadly the CFTC defines an end-user, however,
the greater the danger that the proposed regulation will not
adequately protect against systemic risk and increase
transparency.217 This stems from the idea that the more
participants who qualify as end-users, and are thus subject to
minimal regulation, the less effective the legislation will be in
promoting
transparency.218
More
stringent
disclosure
219
requirements will help address this issue. Some end-users wish
that their trading positions remain private so others will not
mimic their contracts and make their hedging strategies
ineffective.220 This concern does not change the necessity of
regulators’ awareness of OTC market activity to assure that no
participants are abusing the end-user exception.
As discussed in Part V.A, the end-user exception provides
that those claiming the exemption must only disclose that they
intend to use the exemption and how they generally plan to meet
financial obligations.221 Such a boilerplate disclosure statement
will not adequately address Dodd–Frank’s aims to increase
transparency and decrease systemic risk in the OTC market. This
Note argues that disclosure and reporting requirements should
resemble the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement, which is

216. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
217. See Greenberger Letter, supra note 206 (explaining how not enhancing
disclosure and reporting requirements will prevent regulators from adequately
monitoring the market for abuse of the end-user exception).
218. See id.
219. See Am. for Fin. Reform Letter, supra note 209; supra notes 207–09 and
accompanying text.
220. See Michael Sackheim & Elizabeth M. Schubert, Dodd–Frank Act Has
Its First Birthday, but Derivatives End Users Have Little Cause to Celebrate, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 8 (July 21, 2011), available at http://www. blr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Schubert-Derivatives_End_User.pdf (discussing endusers’ fear that public disclosure would make trading strategies ineffective).
221. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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already utilized by many participants in the OTC market.222 For
over 20 years, the ISDA has tackled the issue of promoting
transparency and pricing efficiency in the OTC market while
adapting to the constant changes in financial innovation.223 The
CFTC could look to how the private sector promoted financial
stability in the market and build off that model.
The ISDA Master Agreement provides for increased
documentation of parties’ transactions and for close-out netting in
the event of default.224 To promote economic certainty, the Master
Agreement allows for the nondefaulting party to elect an early
termination date and potentially receive money if the party
incurs a loss while entering into a new derivatives contract.225
These provisions lower credit and legal risk for participants.226
The CFTC could follow the standard form contract, which
promotes low transaction costs, and require parties to provide
additional disclosure of obligations or contract terms where they
differ from the standard form.227 While the Master Agreement
provides for disclosure of types of collateral thresholds, exposure
calculations, payment schedules, netting, and standard contract
terms, the CFTC must ensure that parties provide concrete
specifics of their ability to meet financial obligations.228 Parties
need to have adequate information to reduce counterparty risk,
while regulators need the same data to moderate systemic risk.
The regulation focuses on requirements and needs of the
OTC derivatives market as it stands today. With the rapidly
changing landscape of financial markets, especially the OTC
derivatives market, regulatory schemes may quickly become
222. See Partnoy, supra note 131, at 6 (providing an overview of what the
ISDA Master Agreement requires the parties to disclose).
223. See ISDA Safe, Efficient Markets, supra note 214 (describing the ISDA’s
aim to promote efficiency, accuracy, and stability in the OTC market).
224. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 96, at 29 (discussing the
concept of close-out netting, an important aspect of the ISDA Master
Agreement).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 29–30.
227. See Partnoy, supra note 131, at 9 (stating that standard form
derivatives documentation is cost reducing).
228. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 96, at 27 (displaying the
structure of the ISDA documentation at the relationship and transactional
levels).
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weak or ineffective.229 Because of the rapid growth of the OTC
market and the complexity of financial innovation, regulators
have difficulty in adequately addressing the concerns and risks
this market poses.230 This Note argues that end-users should
meet disclosure requirements as set out in the ISDA Master
Agreement. It will allow regulators to guarantee that the market
is more transparent to address the issues that they see fit.231
VII. Conclusion
The regulation of OTC derivatives has long been a
controversial topic, as seen in the debate between Brooksley Born
and Alan Greenspan in the late 1990s.232 In 2000, with the
passage of the CFMA, regulators believed the best route was to
deregulate the OTC market.233 Unfortunately, this led to a vast,
complex, unregulated market that many claim played a role in
the financial crisis of 2008.234 The financial crisis demonstrates to
regulators that OTC derivatives carry a threat of systemic risk
that needs to be controlled.
This led Congress to pass Title VII of Dodd–Frank, which
aims to address the threat of systemic risk by promoting
transparency in the market.235 The CFTC proposed legislation
that requires the mandatory clearing of swaps, which entails
margin requirements that are quite costly to the parties of the
transaction.236 Pursuant to Congressional intent, the CFTC
proposed an exemption for nonfinancial entities who utilize the
229. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven Schwartz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2011)
(presenting the idea that it is difficult to regulate financial markets because
they are rapidly changing and adapting to new innovations).
230. See, e.g., id.
231. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text (introducing the
proposal of more stringent disclosure requirements to allow a broad end-user
exception).
232. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (introducing theories as to
how the OTC market played a role in the 2008 financial crisis).
235. See OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 155, at 5.
236. See supra Part IV.B.
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market to hedge underlying risk.237 This exemption is meant to
maintain low transaction costs for these participants. While this
is a legitimate concern for end-users, the CFTC should impose
more stringent disclosure requirements than just checking the
exemption box and generally disclosing how the party will meet
financial obligations.238
This proposal is to aid regulators in monitoring the end-users
to determine who is validly claiming the exemption and who is
abusing the exception by speculating.239 While this may increase
costs to end-users to some extent, it will decrease the threat of
systemic risk to the American public and promote transparency
in the OTC market, the aims of Dodd–Frank.
Foreseeing and preventing a financial crisis of the magnitude
of the one in 2008 is an extremely difficult task. Financial
innovation and the complexity of OTC derivatives make this task
far more difficult. While the government is taking measures to
address the systemic threat OTC derivatives pose, these efforts
may soon prove ineffective. The knowledge of derivatives traders
and the rapid change in financial innovation make regulating
this market a daunting task.240 But this Note’s proposal of more
stringent disclosure and reporting requirements can help
increase market transparency which, in turn, makes regulating
the OTC market easier.

237. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating Congress’s intent to
exempt end-users from the mandatory clearing of swaps).
238. See supra Part VI.A.
239. See Greenberger Letter, supra note 206.
240. See e.g., Anabtawi & Schwartz, supra note 229.

